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Abstract
Archivists and librarians play a critical role in preserving and making 
accessible cultural resources, but there is now an uncertainty as to 
whether their traditional expertise is sufficient when dealing with 
digital resources. A particular focus of concern is the authenticity of 
these resources. This article looks at how the concept of authenticity 
has been constructed in traditional environments, and specifically 
by philosophers, art conservators, textual critics, judges, and legisla-
tors. It is organized around three broad definitions of authenticity: 
authentic as true to oneself; authentic as original; and authentic as 
trustworthy statement of fact.
 The examination of these definitions of authenticity and their 
interpretation in different contexts suggests that authenticity is best 
understood as a social construction that has been put into place to 
achieve a particular aim. Its structures and goals vary from one field 
to the next and from one age to another. The article concludes that 
digital resources are comparable to traditional cultural resources 
such as art works, literary texts, and business records; they are in a 
continuous state of becoming and their authenticity is contingent 
and changeable. 
Introduction
The digital medium is becoming the preferred environment in which 
to create materials that will become a part of our historical and cultural 
legacy. Although there are structures in place to help ensure the preserva-
tion of these resources in the traditional formats of parchment and paper, 
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the most recent shift in the technological medium has prompted ques-
tions about how the world’s digital heritage can be preserved, protected, 
and made available for current and future generations.1 One particular 
focus of scholarly concern is the authenticity of these digital resources.2 
The apparent ease with which documents and images can be manip-
ulated in the digital environment has unsettled those whose task it has 
been to protect the trustworthiness of these materials, namely archives 
and libraries. On the whole, these institutions have been considered trust-
worthy repositories; by extension, their holdings are presumed authentic 
unless proven otherwise (Smith, 2003, p. 181).3 This trust has been built 
on centuries of social, cultural, and political negotiations among archives 
and libraries, their governing bodies, and the public. It is this trust—or 
more specifically, the conventions for establishing and sustaining this 
trust—that is now under question. As more holdings become computer-
ized, can the trust that was established in a paper-based environment be 
sustained? Archivists and librarians have played a critical role in preserv-
ing and making available for use cultural resources, but there is now un-
certainty as to whether their traditional expertise is sufficient when deal-
ing with digital materials.4 
Research and reflection on the preservation of authentic digital ma-
terials has tended to focus on the identification and elaboration of pro-
cedural or technological criteria for assessing and protecting the trust-
worthiness of those resources.5 This article takes a different approach. It 
will explore how the notion of authenticity has historically been used in 
different ways, in different contexts, and for different ends. 
The following discussion of authenticity is organized according to 
three broad categories that are based on definitions drawn from the Ox-
ford English Dictionary (2006): (1) authentic as true to oneself; (2) authen-
tic as original; and (3) authentic as trustworthy statement of fact. The first 
category has been the focus of philosophers who associate authenticity 
with a mode of human existence that is generally understood as “being 
true to oneself.” Because being authentic entails not living in imitation 
of someone else, what constitutes authenticity is different for each per-
son. The second category—authentic as original—is of great interest to 
art conservators and textual critics. In the art world, authenticity is no 
longer about whether an individual is being true to himself or herself, but 
whether an object is true to its origins. Authenticity here entails a com-
plex consideration of the intent of the artist, the purpose of the object, 
and the circumstances of its history. Meanwhile, in literary studies, the 
authentic text is an editorial construction of an ideal, and is thus based 
on subjective decisions about what the author may have intended, even 
if those ambitions were never realized. The last category—authentic as 
trustworthy statement of fact—is a concern of the common law of evi-
dence. Authenticity in this context is associated with the truth-value of re-
macneil & mak/constructions of authenticity
28 library trends/summer 2007
cords as reflections of a determinate reality and it revolves around the 
notion of truth as probability.
What will become clear is that, in each category, authenticity is under-
stood as a social construction that has been put into place to achieve a 
particular aim. The structures and goals of authenticity vary from one dis-
cipline to another and from one age to another. On the basis of these dif-
ferent disciplinary perspectives, the article will propose a more nuanced 
understanding of authenticity with which to approach the management 
of digital resources. 
Authentic As True To Oneself: A Human Condition 
7. Belonging to himself, own, proper. Obs. 8. Acting of itself, self-originated, 
automatic 6
Authenticity became the center of many discussions in the eighteenth 
century, when scholarly attention began to shift to the role of the indi-
vidual. One of the issues with which philosophers struggled was how an 
individual could maintain his or her distinctness while living in society. 
There was some fear that the pressures exerted by societal norms would 
dilute the individual sense of self that people were thought to possess. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau most notably recognized how social interaction 
could drown out the inner voices of individuals (Rousseau, 1782/1979, 
1754/1984; also Herder, 1774–1791/1800). He argued that the desire to 
be considered worthy by others—pride, or even vanity—can become so 
overwhelming that people begin to lose contact with who they are as indi-
viduals. In this way, worldly pressures and external influences undermine 
the ability of an individual to focus on developing and sustaining knowl-
edge of him- or herself. 
Authenticity, in this sense, is a manner of being. To be authentic is to 
perceive oneself with clarity by discovering how one ought to be, and to 
strive to live in accordance with this directive. We each have a capacity for 
living a life in a way that is specifically our own. Because each individual is 
endowed with a potentiality that is unique, what constitutes authenticity—
how and what it means to actualize that potentiality—cannot be strictly 
defined. As Charles Taylor (1992) puts it, “There is a certain way of being 
human that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not 
in imitation of anyone else’s” (pp. 28–29). Authenticity is a way, a mode, a 
method. It means something different to each individual and therefore is 
different for each individual. 
Through the following centuries, the concept of authenticity was re-
fined and developed in a number of ways.7 Søren Kierkegaard (1843/1983) 
notably combined the idea with Christian faith, while Friedrich Nietzsche 
(1883/1993, 1872/2000) enfolded it into literary narrative. One of the 
most influential discussants of authenticity in the twentieth century was 
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Martin Heidegger. Like his predecessors, Heidegger believed that au-
thenticity constituted the human struggle to reach self-recognition and 
self-understanding. In Being and Time, Heidegger attempted to create an 
ontological system that would identify authenticity and the strategies by 
which one could achieve an authentic existence. 
Heidegger draws attention to the significance of social, cultural, and 
historical context for the authenticity of being. In contrast to earlier writ-
ers who considered the material world to be a distraction from the pur-
suit of self-knowledge and the authentic life, Heidegger argues that au-
thenticity is inseparable from the world. Authenticity itself is bound up 
in the same discursive framework as the exploration of self. It is thus con-
tingent upon the particular social and historical circumstances of each 
person who seeks it, and indeed contingent upon life itself (Heidegger, 
1927/1980, II.i.263–264). 
Heidegger points out that changes in our environment prompt cor-
responding changes in ourselves. What it means to be you or me can 
transform, depending upon our daily experiences. Consequently, what it 
means to be authentic must change. Authenticity is therefore not an ob-
ject that can be held, or a condition that can be achieved; the authentic 
“me” does not exist as a static state of being, but is in a constant process of 
becoming. Authenticity is thus an anticipation, a process, and a continu-
ous struggle (Heidegger, 1927/1980, II.i.266). 
Because authenticity could not be defined with any great detail or 
rigor, the concept was naturally open to much interpretation and criti-
cism. By the latter part of the twentieth century, it had become a well-
worn term in the hands of existentialist thinkers such as Jean-Paul Sartre 
and Albert Camus.8 In 1962, Theodor Adorno identified a rupture be-
tween the terminology of authenticity and what it was meant to signify. 
For Adorno, authenticity was no longer communicative as an idea. Di-
vested of any meaning, the notion of authenticity became transcendent, 
objectified, and idealized. Adorno (1962/1973) writes, “The fallibility of 
the term is hushed up by the absolute use of the word. . . . [T]he term 
establishes itself as a linguistic eyrie of totalitarian orders” (p. 8). Adorno 
argues that the concept of authenticity had become so idealized that any 
notion of subjectivity that had traditionally been associated with it was 
lost. He describes the way in which the term authenticity erases the com-
plex negotiations by which it gained any currency, and is replaced by an 
empty marker that is taken to be an objective standard.
From this brief overview, we should take with us two important and 
related characteristics of authenticity: contingency and change. Histori-
cally situated, authenticity is sensitive to differences in individual cases 
and contexts, and is therefore necessarily marked by change. The con-
ventions of authenticity are always in flux, responding to changes in the 
world in which it is embedded. As a consequence, authenticity is itself in a 
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process of becoming. The following section will further problematize the 
notion of authenticity by exploring how works of art and literature can be 
the subjects of multiple and equally valid authenticities. 
Authentic As Original
4. Original, first-hand, prototypical; as opposed to copied. Obs; 5. Real, actual, 
‘genuine.’ (Opposed to imaginary, pretended.) arch.; 6. Really proceeding from 
its reputed source or author; of undisputed origin, genuine.
Art Works
In his 1936 essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Repro-
duction,” Walter Benjamin argues that authenticity is crucially linked to 
the existence of an original work of art. An original work of art has an 
aura that is made up of the cumulative tradition that runs from its con-
ception to its present state. This aura is specific to the original piece, and 
constitutes its authenticity. As Benjamin (1936/1968) explains, “The au-
thenticity of a thing is the essence of all that is transmissible from its be-
ginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its testimony to the his-
tory which it has experienced” (p. 221). The authenticity of an art object 
is composed of the identity of the piece, as well as its particular context 
and history; it is its presence in time and space (p. 220). 
In Benjamin’s account of the relationship between authenticity and 
art objects, the aura of the original defies reproducibility and implies fi-
delity to the original intentions of the artist and to the passage of time. 
The question that remains is, how, in practical terms, is that aura to be 
preserved in the physical work of art? In the world of art conservation, the 
two dimensions of an original work’s aura are viewed as competing rather 
than complementary. To restore an art object to its original condition 
requires that the conservator destroy the evidence of the passage of time 
on the object; to preserve that evidence, on the other hand, is to obscure 
the object’s origins and, therefore, the artist’s intentions—what he or she 
wanted the spectator to see.9 
The debate within the community of art conservation fuelled by the 
recent restoration of the Sistine Chapel illustrates the difficulty that art 
conservators face in attempting to reconcile fidelity to original intentions 
with fidelity to the passage of time. The restoration of the Chapel, a four-
teen-year project that was completed in 1994, raised two fundamental is-
sues: firstly, what were Michelangelo’s original intentions? And, secondly, 
given the centuries-old history of the Sistine Chapel frescoes, what parts 
of that history should be preserved? 
The first issue—Michelangelo’s intentions—was raised in the context 
of the radical cleaning of the frescoes on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. 
Defenders of the project maintained that, by removing the “grime of the 
centuries” (the layers of dirt, soot, glue, and overpaint that had accreted 
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over time), the cleaning had restored the colors of the frescoes to their 
original brightness and vibrancy, revealing the Sistine ceiling as Michel-
angelo himself saw it and as he intended the spectator to see it (Brandt, 
1987, 1993). Critics of the cleaning, however, insisted that what the con-
servators pejoratively termed “grime” constituted an integral part of Mi-
chelangelo’s creation. Moreover, James Beck and Michael Daley (1993, 
pp. 63–102) rejected the conservators’ contention that the glue paint on 
the ceiling was the work of earlier restorers, arguing that Michelangelo 
himself had deliberately added this layer on top of the original frescoes to 
reduce the effect of color and to create an illusionistic scheme that relied 
on shadow to achieve the overall perceptual effect. By stripping away all 
the layers of toning paint down to the frescoed plaster, they contended, 
the conservators had stripped the frescoes of intentionality. 
The second issue—determining what parts of the history of the fres-
coes should be preserved—emerged in connection with the restoration 
of the fresco of the Last Judgment by Michelangelo, which decorates the 
wall behind the high altar in the Sistine Chapel. When it was first un-
veiled in 1541, the Last Judgment provoked immediate controversy. The 
Congregation of the Council of Trent declared it to be full of “indecent 
nudes” and “a thousand heresies”; on January 21, 1564, the Council is-
sued a decree ordering that those parts of the fresco that were deemed 
obscene be covered. Between 1565 and 1566, twenty-three of the nude 
figures were covered in loincloths; in subsequent centuries, another eigh-
teen were added, and in the nineteenth century, the total number of loin-
cloths reached forty-one (Mancinelli, 1997, pp. 172–175; Colalluci, 1997, 
p. 194).
During the restoration project, these so-called “censorial draperies” 
were the subject of considerable debate among conservators. Some ar-
gued that all the draperies should be removed, while others argued for 
their complete preservation on the grounds of their historical value. In 
the end, most of the loincloths that were documented to have been added 
after 1750 were removed. Gianluigi Colalluci, the Chief Restorer of the 
Vatican Museums at the time of the restoration, explained the rationale 
for the decision in the following way: “The censorial interventions of the 
sixteenth century were conserved, because they were considered histori-
cal documents of real importance to the Council of Trent and the Coun-
ter-Reformation. Later draperies were generally removed, because they 
were not seen as historical documents, since nothing survives to indicate 
the source of the decision to add them” (1997, p. 197). The conflicting 
intentionalities that intersect across Michelangelo’s work in the Sistine 
Chapel are a part of the tradition of authenticity discussed by Benjamin. 
But in the example described above, part of this tradition is deemed to be 
inauthentic.
The issues that emerged in the course of the restoration of the Sistine 
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Chapel highlight what David Lowenthal (1986) refers to as “the all-too 
familiar perplexities” surrounding the determination of intentionality, in-
cluding:
How to ascertain or adjudicate conflicting evidence about a long-gone 
author’s aim; which individual or epoch to adhere to in a work of mul-
tiple authorship, prolonged creation, or massive restoration; how to 
convey original aims when aging or accident have irreversibly altered 
a work of art or when modern experiences and expectations render 
the artist’s aim outre or banal. . . . Indeed, to communicate any past 
intention it must be revised in the language of the present, and to that 
extent rendered inauthentic. (p. 844)
These perplexities are inevitable because the surviving evidence of 
authorial intentionality is limited and ambiguous. The competing claims 
concerning Michelangelo’s intentions, for example, are based on very lit-
tle evidence about what those intentions might have been; little is known 
about Michelangelo’s actual working method. Furthermore, since all his 
surviving frescoes are in the Sistine Chapel and the adjacent Pauline Cha-
pel, it is impossible to compare those frescoes with others by him that 
might have survived under “less dirty” conditions than those in the Vati-
can (Colalluci, 1997, p. 192). 
Moreover, even if Michelangelo’s intentions could be known, some crit-
ics maintain that they would still need to be balanced against subsequent 
intentions that have transformed his art work over time. Joseph Grigely 
(1995), for example, argues: “The very idea of the artist’s intentions be-
ing a locus of conservation efforts cannot substantiate itself among the 
conflation of different intentions of different participating authorities at 
different times” (p. 87). Any work of art is subject to what he calls “con-
tinuous and discontinuous transience”—variation, drift, rupture—and 
this transience is as integral to the authenticity of a work of art as the 
original intentions of the artist. The late twentieth-century restoration of 
the Sistine Chapel is, itself, one such act of transience. In the eyes of some 
critics, the conservators’ rationale for retaining the Counter-Reformation 
draperies is inconsistent with the overall rationale for the Sistine restora-
tion project, which was the recovery of Michelangelo’s intended work.10 
Grigely, on the other hand, maintains that, “however inconsistent this is, 
it shows how the conservation treatment itself is yet another act of histori-
cal transience, one that neither more nor less than previous treatments 
reflects the ideologies and intentions of those interacting with the work” 
(1995, p. 69). Like Benjamin, Grigely believes that the particular history 
of the art work, here including acts of conservation, are a part of the aura 
and the tradition of authenticity that accumulates around the original 
object.
Grigely’s observations make clear that a work of art is not necessarily 
fixed at a single point in time; its survival and ongoing preservation mean 
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that, in an important sense, it is in a continuous state of becoming. As the 
piece of art ages, it is resituated and recontextualized. Moreover, if we 
accept that a work of art supports different intentions over time, we must 
also admit the possibility that such work can possess different authentic-
ities over time. If that is the case, the authenticity of an art work, like 
Heidegger’s authenticity of self, can only be understood within an ever-
changing discursive framework. Thus, the authenticity of the art work is 
also necessarily in a continuous state of becoming. The “authentic” art 
work, in other words, does not exist outside of the discursive framework 
of conservation theory and practice. By these lights, conservators do not 
preserve or restore the authenticity of an art work so much as they con-
struct and reconstruct that authenticity in accordance with their under-
standing of the nature of art works and current conventions for treating 
them.11 That understanding is shaped, in turn, by the role of museums 
in the preservation of cultural heritage, and their role also changes over 
time. 
Seeing the authenticity of an art work as a contingent and changeable 
construct of art conservators and museums, rather than a quality that in-
heres in the art work itself, does not result in the surrender of belief in 
authenticity as a rationale for the conservation of art works; it simply in-
dicates the need to historicize the meaning of authenticity and reposition 
it in relation to the nature and purpose of art conservation. It also calls 
attention to the need to resist the temptation to elevate authenticity to an 
idealized and objective standard that transcends history and contingency. 
It was just such elevation that, according to Adorno, had emptied the con-
cept of meaning in the last century. 
Literary Texts 
Like art conservators, textual critics disagree about the relative author-
ity of original and subsequent intentions in establishing the authenticity 
of a literary text. The disagreement is manifested most strikingly in the 
different objectives underlying the two major approaches to the scholarly 
editing of modern texts. In the “authorial” school, the original intention 
of the author is the prevailing consideration in assessing the authentic-
ity of the text. By contrast, the “sociological” or “collaborative” approach 
displaces the authority of the author in the interpretation of text in favor 
of a dynamic notion of authenticity that depends on a particular reader, a 
particular instantiation of the text, and the particular context in which it 
is being read. In both cases, we shall see that the validity of authenticity in 
literary texts continues to be debated, and indeed the very meaning of an 
authentic text continues to change. 
Textual criticism has its origins in the historical criticism of biblical 
and classical texts. There are no autograph manuscripts of the classical 
authors; any copies that were written in hands of the authors have been 
macneil & mak/constructions of authenticity
34 library trends/summer 2007
lost. As a consequence, there is little evidence from which to reconstruct 
their intentions. Classical philologists thus seek “to recover, or approxi-
mate by historical reconstruction, the lost original works of ancient au-
thors” (McGann, 1983, p. 23). To do so, scholars rely on versions of the 
texts in manuscripts that were copied subsequent to the composition of 
the original text. These manuscripts are of varying quality, having been 
subject to physical deterioration, errors in transcription, or even deliber-
ate modification. The work of many early philologists involved establish-
ing the relationships of the manuscripts, and examining and emending 
their texts according to the dominant reading or to the earliest known 
copy of the text.12 The appeal to the earliest copy as the most authentic 
witness of a text is based on the assumption that the closer the manuscript 
is to the lost original, the less likely it is to have been exposed to corrup-
tion. As we shall see in the next section, this same logic is used in the 
process of fact-finding in law. 
The emphasis on the intentions of the author is continued in the criti-
cism of modern literary texts most robustly by the Anglo-American school 
of “eclectic” critical editions. Like their counterparts who study classical 
texts, the goal of these critics is to reconstruct the text as it was intended 
by its author. As Jerome McGann (1983) explains: 
The idea of a finally intended text corresponds to the “lost original” 
which the textual critics of classical works sought to reconstruct by 
recension. Both are “ideal texts”—that is to say, they do not exist in 
fact—but in each case the critics use this ideal text heuristically, as a 
focusing device for studying the extant documents. Both classical and 
modern editors work toward their ideal text by a process of recension 
that aims to approximate the Ideal as closely as possible. (p. 56) 
The difference between the scholar of classical texts and the modern 
critic is, according to McGann (1983), that the modern critic “actually pos-
sesses the ‘lost originals’ [in the sense of extant authorial manuscripts], 
which the classical critic is forced to hypothesize” (p. 57). Consequently, 
the modern critic’s concept of an ideal text is “a pure abstraction, whereas 
the classical critic’s ideal text remains, if ‘lost,’ historically actual” (p. 57). 
The difference is attributable to the fact that critics working within the 
modern eclectic tradition believe that the medium of literature is the 
words of a language, not the physical carrier of those words; a literary 
work is thus physically non-specific, existing in multiple artifacts but not 
located in any single instantiation. Thus, the ideal text that the eclectic 
critic reconstructs is a material artifact that seeks to approximate the ab-
stract work (Tanselle, 1989, pp. 25–30). 
The eclectic theory of critical editions posits that the final intentions 
of the author are, inevitably, corrupted by transmission: copy editors al-
ter the author’s punctuation and spelling; friends and relatives revise 
typescripts and page proofs; publishers subtract and add material to new 
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editions, with or without the author’s permission; authors themselves ob-
sessively correct and revise their texts, sometimes in contradictory ways, 
sometimes in response to external pressures, and so forth. Thus, the task 
of the textual critic is to reconstruct, from among the many “corrupt” 
variants of a literary text that have existed over time, the authentic text, 
namely, the one that best embodies the final intentions of the author. The 
text is then contextualized through the preparation of a critical appara-
tus, which contains notes and commentary on the text, the history of its 
variants, as well as the chronology of the life and works of the author. 
A brief enumeration of some of the variant versions of Ulysses by James 
Joyce that were in circulation between 1918 and 1936 illustrates the chal-
lenges textual critics face when attempting to reconstruct the finally-in-
tended text through an eclectic critical edition.13 Included among those 
versions are: five sections of the novel that appeared in The Egoist in 1919; 
parts of the book that appeared in serial form in The Little Review be-
tween 1918 and 1920; draft versions of earlier sections of Ulysses, given or 
sold to well-wishers by Joyce during that same time period; a significantly 
revised and corrected copy of the versions sent to the two magazines that 
was supplied by Joyce to Maurice Darantière, the printer contracted by 
Shakespeare and Company, which was the publisher of the first limited 
edition of Ulysses; the first limited edition of Ulysses published in 1922 and, 
according to Joyce, replete with printer’s errors; a second limited edition 
brought out later the same year with an errata page listing emendations 
by Joyce but still plagued with errors owing to Joyce’s poor eyesight; a 
1924 Shakespeare and Company unlimited edition containing additional 
“corrections”; a 1922 and 1923 Egoist Press limited edition; a holograph 
manuscript of Ulysses, which Joyce had sold to a New York lawyer who had, 
in turn, auctioned it off in 1924 to a Dr. A. Rosenbach; an Odyssey Press 
edition that appeared in Hamburg in 1932, having been shepherded 
through the press by Joyce’s friend Stuart Gilbert; a 1935 Limited Editions 
Club version, with illustrations by Matisse and “corrections suggested to 
Mr. Gilbert by James Joyce himself”; the first unbanned American edi-
tion published by Random House in 1934; and the Bodley Head edition 
brought out in 1936 that had been proofed by Joyce the previous sum-
mer. From these and later versions, and by drawing on additional sources 
such as letters and diaries, the textual critic is expected to reconstruct the 
authentic, ideal Ulysses—that is, the one that embodies Joyce’s final inten-
tions most clearly. 
Eclectic critical editions thus aim to reconstitute an “original” text 
that never existed except, perhaps, in the mind of the author. G. Thomas 
Tanselle (1989), a staunch defender of eclectic editing, maintains that, 
even if an ideal text never physically existed prior to its reconstitution in 
an eclectic edition, the inferred authorial intentions that shape it have 
as legitimate a claim to historical reality as do the texts that were finally 
macneil & mak/constructions of authenticity
36 library trends/summer 2007
published; he concedes, however, that these intentions are more difficult 
to locate: “If we grant that authors have intentions and therefore that the 
intentions of past authors are historical facts, we require no further justifi-
cation for the attempt to recover those intentions and to reconstruct texts 
reflecting them, whatever our chances of success may be” (p. 76). Tanselle’s 
comments make clear that for textual critics working in the tradition of 
eclectic editions, the authentic text is the one that reveals the single, cre-
ative mind that provided the impetus for the literary work: the mind of the 
author. From their perspective, restoring the text to an imagined historical 
moment before the onset of corruption is the way to reveal that mind. 
By contrast, textual critics who adopt a sociological approach to the 
editing of literary texts hold a different view on the value of the inten-
tion of the author. Influenced by the theories of Jacques Derrida (1982), 
Stephen Mailloux (1982), Michel Foucault (1984), and Roland Barthes 
(1977), who rejected the notion of determinate meaning and questioned 
the importance of the author in the interpretation of texts, these scholars 
eschew the eclectic approach to textual criticism and shift interpretative 
authority onto the reader. From their perspective, “texts are produced 
and reproduced under specific social and institutional conditions and 
hence . . . every text, including those that may appear to be purely private, 
is a social text” (McGann, 1991, p. 21). The interpretation of texts is not 
closed, but rather is an open-ended conversation among author, editor, 
publisher, and reader.
The implications of this perspective can be summarized as follows: the 
production of a literary text is not the individual endeavor of an author 
but a collaborative enterprise between and among the author, editors (in-
cluding the editors of critical editions), publishers, and readers; variant 
versions of a text are not “corruptions” to be eliminated but, rather, legiti-
mate textual formations worth studying in their own right; the meaning of 
a literary text is shaped not only by its “linguistic code” (i.e., its language) 
but, also, by its “bibliographic code” (i.e., its physical embodiment and 
context); finally, the primary task of the textual critic is not to reconstruct 
authorial intentions through the establishment of a single definitive text 
but, rather, to reveal the complex and open-ended histories of textual 
change and variance through the presentation of multiple texts. 
Textual scholarship in the wake of McGann and others14 emphasizes 
the instability of texts, foregrounding: 
The cause of contingency in the double sense both of the text itself 
being historically contingent, in its circumstances of production and 
reception, and of it being contingent in its (re-)construction in the 
present. Such considerations work against conceptualizing the text as 
an ahistorical transcendent monument, or even as a transhistorical one, 
and instead promote a view of it as historically situated both in its origi-
nal creation and in its later constructions. (Bornstein, 1993, p. 2)
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Some sense of what is entailed in the idea of textual instability is pro-
vided by Hans Walter Gabler’s synoptic and critical edition of Joyce’s 
Ulysses published in 1984. The edition is arranged with Joyce’s manuscript 
text (the synoptic edition) running consecutively on the edition’s left-
hand pages, or versos, with a parallel reading text (the critical edition) 
running consecutively on the right-hand pages, or rectos. The verso pages 
show the text in various stages of composition while the recto pages show 
the critically established text, or, the text at its “ultimate level of compo-
sitional development” (Gabler, 1984, p. 1903). The editorial judgements 
on which the established text is based are defended in the footnoted ap-
paratus and the appended textual notes.
The most innovative feature of the edition is its synoptic presentation 
of Ulysses as it moves from manuscript to print (Gabler, 1984, p. 1901). 
The “continuous manuscript” text is displayed synoptically by a diacritical 
system of notation that analyzes its layers of growth. The dynamics of tex-
tual development (i.e., the continuous process of writing and rewriting) 
are symbolized as deletions, additions, and replacements; additional sym-
bols show at what stage in the composition process the revisions were car-
ried out and where in the manuscript material they are located (Gabler, 
1984, pp. 1901–1903). In this way, the link between text and apparatus is 
made visible and explicit to the user. 
The side-by-side placement of the synoptic and established texts also 
allows the reader to observe the process by which one reading is margin-
alized by another (McGann, 1985, p. 300). The marginalized reading of 
the synoptic text is not erased by the dominant reading of the established 
text. Rather, the two readings are situated historically in relation to each 
other. As a result, the marginalized and dominant readings may be seen 
simply as two different readings, rather than as “error” and “correction” 
(McGann, 1985, p. 300). Moreover, by laying bare both Joyce’s composi-
tional process in the synoptic text and the editors’ own judgements and 
choices in constructing the established text in the footnoted apparatus 
and appended notes, Gabler’s Ulysses exposes the inevitable limits of any 
edition and reveals the possibility of alternative constructions of a literary 
text. Gabler’s synoptic text reflects one history of Ulysses—a history of its 
initial composition and evolving linguistic code. An alternative synoptic 
text might reflect, instead, a history of the initial production and evolv-
ing bibliographic code of Ulysses (McGann, 1985, p. 292). The possibility 
of alternative constructions suggests, in turn, the possibility of multiple 
authenticities that are based on the specific set of determinants under 
which an edition is prepared. Authorial intention is not abandoned as a 
rationale for the reconstruction of a literary text; it simply loses its status 
as the only legitimate rationale. 
The debates about authorial and sociological approaches to the recon-
struction of literary texts reflect changing perspectives about what con-
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stitutes the “authentic” text, and serve to reinforce themes that emerged 
in the foregoing discussion about the restoration of art works: a growing 
awareness of the ambiguity of authorial intentions and the instability of 
literary texts; an increasing understanding that the authentic literary text 
is not shaped by authorial intentions so much as it is constructed by a par-
ticular editorial theory of authorial intentions; a movement away from the 
language of “purity” and “corruption” when speaking about authenticity; 
and a recognition of the presence of multiple intentionalities in a literary 
text that endures over time. As George Bornstein (1993) observes, textual 
critics are coming to understand that, “we cannot hope through textual 
scholarship to recover an ideal text like a well-wrought urn, but only to 
increase the self-awareness and internal consistency of the choices that we 
make in constituting the [literary text] for our own time” (p. 2). 
Authentic As Trustworthy in the Eyes of the Law: 
Business Records 
3.a. Entitled to acceptance or belief, as being in accordance with fact, or as 
stating fact; reliable, trustworthy, of established credit.
The association of authenticity with the trustworthiness of records as 
statements of fact is embedded in the law of evidence in common law ju-
risdictions. Such association is located specifically in the rules governing 
the admissibility of business records. The legal criteria for assessing the 
trustworthiness of business records are similar in certain respects to the 
criteria for establishing the authenticity of art works and literary texts. 
Like art conservators and textual critics, judges and legislators are con-
cerned with issues of fidelity. Unlike art conservators and textual critics, 
however, judges and legislators deal with pragmatic texts—records—that 
are assumed to reflect facts or events in the external world. The trustwor-
thiness of a record as a statement of facts, therefore, rests primarily on its 
fidelity to an original event, namely, the event that gave rise to the record, 
rather than on any fidelity to an actual or constructed original artifact or 
text.15 
Evidence law comprises the whole of the rules and principles that reg-
ulate the relevancy, admissibility, and weight of evidence in judicial pro-
ceedings. The purpose of such proceedings is to resolve legal disputes by 
establishing the truth of conflicting allegations; in other words, to discover 
“what really happened.” However, as Mark Cousins (1993) observes: 
“Really” is used in a specialised sense. “Really” is what is relevant to 
the law, what is definable by law, what may be argued in terms of law 
and evidence, what may be judged and what may be subject to appeal. 
“Reality” as far as the law is concerned is a set of representations of the 
past, ordered in accordance with legal categories and rules of evidence 
into a decision which claims to rest upon the truth. But this truth of the 
past, the representations of events, is a strictly legal truth. (p. 132) 
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In the discussion that follows, we shall see how the legal interpretation 
of the trustworthiness of records is inextricably linked to the understand-
ing of truth that is operative in the fact-finding process. 
The contours of that truth are established at the outset by the rules 
governing the relevancy of evidence. Before evidence is admitted, it must 
be demonstrated that it is relevant, meaning that it bears directly upon 
the point or fact in issue and proves, or tends to prove, an alleged propo-
sition. The legal notion of relevancy derives from the theory of logical 
relevancy, the first principle of which states, 
knowledge of facts is always a matter of probabilities. We may acquire 
knowledge of matters of fact by drawing inferences from evidence, 
but these inferences can only alter the probability that some fact does 
or does not exist and can never establish with certainty that some fact 
does or does not exist. (Wigmore, 1983, vol. 1A, § 37.4) 
Truth, by these lights, is defined as an acceptable degree of rational 
belief or “moral certainty” (Shapiro, 1991, pp. 7–8). The truth of any 
proposition is based on reasoning from the relevant evidence and mea-
sured, not in terms of absolute certainty, but rather in terms of probabil-
ity, which will always be a matter of degree.
Inferences rest on generalizations—also known as evidential hypothe-
ses—which are based on common sense experience or logic. Such gener-
alizations assume the form of “relative frequency statements” which assert 
that an existent fact (i.e., the evidence) makes more or less probable the 
hypothetical fact (i.e., the alleged proposition) (Wigmore, 1983, vol. 1A, 
§ 37.4).
Of course, any generalization, when applied to specific cases, neces-
sarily possesses “a potential range of indeterminacy”; events are always 
inherently distinctive and a generalization is bound to be only a partial 
description of characteristics and tendencies that are to be found in re-
ality (Wigmore, 1983, vol. 1A, § 37.7 at 1078). The “range of potential 
indeterminacy” that is inherent in all inferences and generalizations is 
not ignored by evidence scholars. Wigmore (1974), for example, points 
out that, while in some cases a generalization is “more a fiction than a 
fact,” it is, nevertheless, “a fiction which we can hardly afford in our law 
openly to repudiate.” (vol. 5, § 1632).16 To function effectively as a societal 
mechanism for dispute resolution, the legal system requires at least the 
appearance of determinate and generalizable meanings and a minimum 
of ambiguity. 
The determination of what constitutes relevant evidence revolves 
around a number of questions. Did an event occur or not? Do reports or 
allegations that an event has occurred correspond to the best evidence of 
the existence of such an event? Who and what are responsible for it? What 
are the lines of causality to be drawn in respect of the event? What degrees 
of responsibility do or can particular persons bear? (Cousins, 1993, p. 
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132) Given the centrality of the event, it is not surprising, therefore, that 
a key assumption of the law of evidence is that a piece of information is 
more likely to be true if it was produced close to the events that gave rise 
to the legal proceedings. Kim Lane Scheppele (1998) describes this as the 
“ground-zero” theory of evidence. According to that theory, “The reliabil-
ity and relevance of knowledge . . . are thought to lessen with distance in 
time and space from the original event. And reliable and relevant knowl-
edge is the essential ingredient in the determination of truth” (p. 323). 
The ground-zero theory is reminiscent of the theory of the lost exemplar 
that is used in classical philology. Both theories assume that evidence gen-
erated closer to the original event is more accurate than evidence that was 
generated later. 
As Scheppele (1998) makes clear, the ground-zero theory is problem-
atic for a couple of reasons. First, the notion that it is possible to recover 
the “original purity” of an event is fraught with epistemic frailties: 
The idea about truth . . . is precisely that . . . one can find somehow 
untainted or “raw” description that then gets tainted or “cooked” in 
subsequent retellings. . . . [However], as Ludwig Wittgenstein reiter-
ated perhaps most powerfully, seeing is never pure in the first place, 
but is always “seeing as.” In other words, the first version of events also 
has a perspective embedded in it, like with any other version of events. 
(pp. 333–334)
Moreover, because the theory assumes that relevant knowledge is con-
centrated at ground zero, it tends to deem irrelevant the broader social 
context for that event even though that context might provide a more ad-
equate causal account of the event. In this way, the law of evidence privi-
leges certain kinds of truth-claims while marginalizing others.
The principles of logical relevancy and the ground-zero theory of evi-
dence are well illustrated in the legal rule that deals specifically with the 
trustworthiness of business records as statements of fact. This rule is called 
the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Business records are consid-
ered to possess what Wigmore (1974) calls “a circumstantial probability 
of trustworthiness.” The generalizations offered in support of that prob-
ability are threefold: firstly, the habit of making such records with regu-
larity will prevent casual inaccuracies and counteract any temptation to 
misstatements; secondly, since the records are part of the regular course 
of business, an error or misstatement is almost certain to be detected; 
and, thirdly, if the persons who make the record are under a duty to an 
employer, they risk censure or dismissal for making inaccurate records 
(vol. 5, § 1522). The potential range of indeterminacy that affects these 
particular generalizations stems from the fact that they are based on the 
presumed record-keeping practices of a specific type of bureaucracy, that 
is, one characterized by a hierarchical authority structure and close super-
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vision. However, such generalizations may not be translatable to records 
generated in bureaucracies that do not conform to this type. 
The business records exception treats a record as a testimonial asser-
tion of the facts contained in it. In keeping with the ground-zero theory, 
the trustworthiness of that testimony depends on the proximity of the 
witness (i.e., the author of the record) to the event in question (i.e., the 
facts stated in the record). Accordingly, a business record is admissible if 
it meets the following conditions: it was made in the usual and ordinary 
course of business; it was made at or near the time of the act, transac-
tion, occurrence, or event being recorded; the person who observed the 
event and the person who recorded it were both acting under a business 
duty to observe that event and record it; and neither the observer nor the 
recorder had any motive to misrepresent the information in the record 
(Wigmore, 1974, vol. 5, § 1523–1530).17
The exception assumes that an objective reality is retrievable through 
subsequent representations of it and that there exists a straightforward 
and stable relationship between a representation (a record) and its refer-
ent (a pre-existent reality). Thus, a record that satisfies the conditions of 
the rule is taken to be an accurate reflection of that original event, free 
from the corruption of interpretation on the part of the observer and re-
corder. The apparent absence of overt interpretation provides the illusion 
that the record not only conveys fact, but is the embodiment of fact.18
However as we have already seen, the notion that any account of an 
event can be free of interpretation is erroneous. Even if some idea of the 
original event is retrievable through the record, the report itself does not 
exist outside of signification; it is filtered through a certain perspective. 
The record cannot be read transparently, for its writing is shaped by par-
ticular constraints that may remain invisible to us. In this respect, records 
are similar to art works and literary texts. That is, they are susceptible to 
multiple interpretations and could be said to possess multiple authentici-
ties, depending on the circumstances of those interpretations. 
The inferences and generalizations about what makes a business re-
cord trustworthy in the eyes of the law are thus partial in two senses: they 
are incomplete and they are also biased in favor of a particular perspec-
tive. This does not mean that these inferences and generalizations are 
necessarily invalid. It simply means that they reflect only one interpreta-
tion about the nature of records and bureaucratic record-keeping proce-
dures. That interpretation is grounded in a presumed correspondence 
between a record and the reality it purports to represent; a presumption 
that reflects perhaps more than anything the legal system’s need for stable 
and determinate referents.
Once a record has been admitted for consideration by the tribunal, its 
trustworthiness is tested again through examination and cross-examina-
tion. It is assumed that any weaknesses or deficiencies in the records that 
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were overlooked at the admissibility stage will be exposed upon cross-ex-
amination. Such assumption reflects the common law’s faith in the ad-
versarial process and its practice of cross-examination as the most effec-
tive means of establishing the trustworthiness of evidence in general and 
records in particular. In an adversarial process, the facts of the case are 
provided to the fact finder in the form of two alternating one-sided ac-
counts. According to Dale Nance (1988), “a principal justification for the 
adversary process is that the self-interest of the parties will bring about 
a thorough investigation and vigorous clash of evidence from which the 
relatively detached trier of fact will best be able to discern the truth” (p. 
235). The process of truth-discovery is symbolized here as a modern ver-
sion of the medieval trial by battle. 
Responsibility for weighing the evidence rests with the trier of fact, 
typically, a lay jury.19 The weight of evidence refers to the believability or 
persuasiveness of evidence in supporting one side of a factual issue rather 
than the other (Black, 1990, s.v. weight of evidence). In assessing the 
weight of records, the jury must take into account their trustworthiness, 
not only in relation to the facts they are supposed to embody, but also in 
relation to other facts admitted in evidence. For that reason, a record may 
be deemed more trustworthy in one context and less trustworthy in an-
other; its truth-value may shift as it is repositioned and recontextualized 
in relation to different sets of facts. 
In recent years, evidence scholars have questioned the legal system’s 
faith in the adversarial process as an effective means for testing the trust-
worthiness of evidence. The practice of allowing two adversaries to control 
the development of evidence at trial, for example, has been criticized by 
Nance (1988), who maintains that the evidence that is most advantageous 
to the litigant who is determined to win a trial does not always coincide 
with the evidence that a jury would find most helpful in the resolution of 
the factual issue. In other words, the “strategically best” evidence does not 
always coincide with the “epistemically best” evidence (p. 240). Nance’s 
criticism is indicative of a growing recognition by evidence scholars that 
the presentation of evidence cannot escape theoretical shaping. Evidence 
is not simply presented to the tribunal for consideration; it is selected 
and shaped by the parties to conform to a particular narrative about what 
happened and why. This view of the fact-finding process is reflected in 
Richard Gaskins’ (1992) observation that, while “legal issues are nomi-
nally about facts,” in practice, they are more accurately characterized as 
“contests of persuasion concerning indeterminate matters” (p. 26). 
It is not only the opposing parties who mold the evidence to fit a par-
ticular narrative; the evidence is also subjected to theoretical shaping by 
the lay jury in the process of weighing the evidence. The legal system’s 
faith in the lay jury is grounded in a belief in the principle of “univer-
sal cognitive competence,” which asserts that every normal and unbiased 
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person, given a proper presentation of all the relevant evidence about any 
factual issue, will come to the same conclusion about it.20 According to 
Jonathan Cohen (1977), the principle presupposes that when individuals 
assume the role of jurors, they come equipped with a stock of commonly 
accepted generalizations about human behavior, as well as an awareness 
of the kinds of circumstances that either favor or oppose the application 
of such generalizations (p. 274).
The belief in a universal cognitive competence, however, does not ac-
cord with the understanding of human cognition that has emerged from 
research in several disciplines, among them philosophy of science, psy-
chology, artificial intelligence, and literary theory. That research suggests 
that “it is impossible to see the world except through a lens shaped by 
our world experiences, culture and internal knowledge structures . . . the 
observer is not separate from the system being studied and . . . the act of 
observation or measurement alters the thing observed” (MacCrimmon, 
1990, vol. 1, pp. 347–348). Empirical research by cognitive scientists into 
the juror decision-making process specifically suggests that jurors do not 
begin with objective knowledge and make reasoned inferences from the 
evidence based on a universally available stock of knowledge about the 
common course of events. Instead, they actively organize, elaborate, and 
interpret the evidence during the course of the trial into a narrative form. 
To interpret the evidence and fill in gaps, they use “schemas” or theoreti-
cal constructs, based on their individual experiences and background as-
sumptions (Pennington & Hastie, 1986, pp. 242–258; Jackson, 1996, pp. 
318–319). Drawing on this research, some evidence scholars argue that 
it is not possible for jurors to determine the truth of what happened; the 
best they can do is to fit the evidence to a theory or story about what 
happened (Jackson, 1988). Other evidence scholars, while accepting that 
theoretical constructs of various kinds shape and structure the juror’s per-
ception of the evidence, maintain that the obverse is also true, that is, the 
theoretical shaping of evidence is dependent on events or states of affairs 
that are accepted as genuine facts (Tillers, 1988). Although the recent 
evidence scholarship reflects differing perspectives on the relationship 
between evidence and theory, there is general agreement on one point, 
namely, “that evidence may be partitioned in different ways and that how 
we partition and see evidence depends on the theoretical perspectives 
with which we approach it” (Tillers, 1988, p. 317).
The themes that have emerged in the course of this discussion echo 
themes we have encountered in earlier sections. Firstly, the notion of an 
authentic record in evidence law (in the sense of a trustworthy statement 
of facts), like the notion of an authentic art work or literary text, is shaped 
to a considerable degree within a specific social and institutional frame-
work; its authenticity does not inhere in the record itself but is actively 
constructed in accordance with the theoretical and methodological as-
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sumptions operative within that framework. Viewed from this perspective, 
the legal rules of evidence may be described more accurately as “socially 
constructed narratives” (Jackson, 1988, p. 3). The business records ex-
ception, for example, constitutes a narrative about bureaucratic record-
keeping practices, one that is contingent upon a particular view of bu-
reaucracy. Secondly, within the fact-finding process itself, the notion of 
what constitutes a trustworthy record is not fixed and stable; it shifts as it 
is resituated and recontextualized in relation to other facts and evidence. 
This suggests that records, like art works and literary texts, are open to 
different interpretations and, thus, different authenticities, depending on 
the interpretive framework. The notion of what constitutes a trustworthy 
record in the eyes of the common law is shaped by a particular perspec-
tive on the nature of truth and the best means of discovering it. It does 
not, in principle, undermine alternative notions of what makes a record 
trustworthy that may be shaped by different perspectives. 
Authenticity and the Preservation of Digitzed and 
Born-digital Resources
As we have seen, authenticity is a social construct that has been em-
ployed by a number of disciplines to help structure their particular envi-
ronments. We have examined how being authentic can mean responding 
in our own individual ways to the everyday changes in the world; we have 
discussed how conserving an authentic work of art necessarily entails the 
erasure of one of the many traditions that intersect across the original, 
all of which could be deemed crucial to its authenticity. We have seen 
how the identity of a definitively authentic text can be problematized; and 
we have explored how the legal notion of what constitutes a trustworthy 
record privileges certain kinds of truth-claims while marginalizing oth-
ers. By looking across the disciplines, we have discovered that authenticity 
itself is a creature of circumstance. What it means to be authentic contin-
ues to change, and the parameters and content of authenticity are always 
under negotiation. Authenticity provides a semblance of stability and a 
mode by which each disciplinary area can function. 
The digital environment resists the imposition of traditional structures 
of stability because it dramatically accelerates the process of change. It is 
precisely this dynamic characteristic of digital technology that has been 
the source of anxiety for librarians and archivists. To be sure, they are ac-
customed to change of other sorts. For instance, paper deteriorates natu-
rally, but its slow process of deterioration affords a semblance of stability 
that is absent from the digital medium. Although librarians and archivists 
have never exercised absolute control over the natural deterioration of 
parchment and paper holdings, these resources can and have been de-
clared authentic. In a similar way, librarians and archivists cannot exercise 
absolute control over how different computers running different software 
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will render their digital holdings over time. This failing does not mean 
that there is no structure by which to preserve these resources, by which 
trust could be garnered, or by which authenticity could be invoked, but 
rather that the criteria for assessing the authenticity of digital materials 
must tolerate a range of variability befitting the situation. In the same 
way that the criteria for assessing the authenticity of traditional materials 
account for the transformative effects of time, such as the natural decom-
position of paper, so too should the criteria for assessing digital materials 
acknowledge the inevitability of change.
The preservation of “authentic” digital materials is perceived to have 
been made more difficult by the technology itself, which promotes the 
proliferation of multiple and simultaneous instantiations. For which of 
these instantiations falls under the responsibility of the librarian or archi-
vist, and what constitutes its authenticity? Because these questions cannot 
be answered with any specificity, the management of digital materials may 
involve shifting the prevailing attitude from an approach that is character-
ized by constriction to one of expansion.
As we have discussed, it has been the scholarly tradition to trace the 
lineage of art and text to identify their variants, and the work of librarians 
and archivists has been to support this endeavor. However, this enterprise 
no longer has the same value when applied to digital materials. Digital 
resources may now be copied endlessly with no discernible loss of quality. 
As W. J. Mitchell (1992) observes: 
In general, computer files are open to modification at any time, and 
mutant versions proliferate rapidly and endlessly. . . . So we must aban-
don the traditional conception of an art world populated by stable, 
enduring, finished works and replace it with one that recognizes con-
tinual mutation and proliferation of variants. (pp. 51–52) 
There is no final act of closure in the digital environment that cor-
responds to the traditional notion of “publication,” indicating the final, 
finished piece. Rather, the “publication” of a digital work might entail the 
opposite—that it is now open and ready for the copying. 
In his discussion of digital images, Mitchell (1992) argues that it might 
be more useful to understand these materials as allographic rather than 
autographic; namely, digital images, because they are digital, enable and 
encourage duplication. The same could be said for most digital resources 
that fall under the purview of librarians and archivists. He writes: 
We might best regard digital images, then, neither as ritual objects (as 
religious paintings have served) nor as objects of mass consumption 
(as photographs and printed images are in Walter Benjamin’s celebrated 
analysis), but as fragments of information that circulate in the high-speed 
networks now ringing the globe that can be received, transformed, and 
recombined like DNA to produce new intellectual structures having their 
own dynamics and value. (Mitchell, 1992, p. 52)
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It is part of the character of these resources to be copied and reinter-
preted in different contexts. Thus, if one of the qualities of digital materi-
als is to be allographic, that is, to enable copying and manipulation and to 
be used in different ways and for different purposes, this aspect may need 
to be accommodated in the process of preservation. 
In addition to the allographic nature of digital resources, which in-
volves multiple and simultaneous intentionalities, also brought to the 
fore is their polysemic21 character. That is, in addition to their ability to 
support multiple and simultaneous intentionalities, they also encourage 
multiple, simultaneous, and possibly dissonant meanings. For instance, 
the debate about authorial and sociological approaches to textual criti-
cism has resulted in an expansion of the boundaries of editorial theory 
and exercised a substantial influence on the way scholarly editions are 
envisaged and prepared using digital technologies. The vision of scholarly 
editions presented by proponents of the sociological approach to textual 
criticism emphasizes variability over fixity of meaning, open-ended repre-
sentation over closed representation, and the process of editing over its 
product. The World Wide Web is viewed as the ideal vehicle for exploiting 
this vision of multiple intentionalities, multiple meanings, and multiple 
authenticities.
It is indeed the place of librarians and archivists to place a structure 
of stability over what seems to be an endless flow of infinite possibilities. 
Some resources will require different modes of stabilization than oth-
ers. Some resources may require more stabilization than others; this will 
depend on what the material in question is, and wherein its capacity to 
generate consequences is located. For a digital work of art, its capacity to 
generate consequences may lie in it remaining allographic and polyse-
mic; one of its most important intentions may be to provoke action, reac-
tion, adoption, manipulation, and absorption. Meanwhile, the capacity of 
a business record to generate consequences may lie in its text remaining 
fixed; one of its most important intentions may be to provoke action by 
the words that it carries.
The foregoing discussions have highlighted the fact that authenticity is 
not a fixed notion, but is an idea that is shaped by a range of factors; the 
meaning of authenticity changes depending on its context and purpose. 
The authenticity of digital materials, correspondingly, cannot be defined 
in any monolithic sense. Just as people, art, text, and records possess their 
own kinds of authenticity, each digital resource will also have its own au-
thenticity or indeed authenticities. In order to support this expansion 
of intentions, meanings, and authenticities, librarians and archivists can 
recognize and advertise their own agency in the management of digital 
resources. 
Librarians and archivists are not neutral preservers of digital resources, 
but active agents in the reconstitution of these resources over time. The 
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decisions that they make about preservation determine how the materi-
als will be accessed, read, and understood by users. For that reason, their 
decisions should be made known: Which intentions and which meanings 
have been privileged and preserved, and for what reason? Librarians and 
archivists may be loath to show themselves so visibly in the process of pres-
ervation, but there may be growing pressure to do so because, as Mitchell 
observes, “There is an erosion of traditional boundaries between artist or 
photographer, editor, archivist, publisher, republisher, and viewer” (1992, 
p. 53). As these traditional boundaries erode, it is increasingly important 
that the custodians distinguish their intentions from the multitude of oth-
ers that intersect across the digital materials in their care.
If the process of preservation is made visible, users are better equipped 
to make an informed decision about whether the materials meet their 
specific requirements for authenticity. Users play a critical role in assess-
ing the nature and degree of trustworthiness that these materials ought to 
be accorded in particular circumstances; this is because their assessment 
is based on a wider range of considerations than are typically taken into 
account by the preserver. The procedures that librarians and archivists es-
tablish for preserving the authenticity of digital resources are thus merely 
a starting point in a socially negotiated and historically situated process of 
assessment. 
Perhaps the most important conclusion that librarians and archivists 
may draw from this exploration of different constructions of authenticity 
is that digital resources, like art works, literary texts and business records 
are in a continuous state of becoming as they are situated and resituated, 
initially within their original environments and subsequently within li-
braries and archives. The long-term preservation of “authentic” digital 
resources is, equally, an ongoing process in which librarians and archivists 
construct and reconstruct authenticity in accordance with their under-
standing of the nature of those resources and current conventions for 
managing them. That understanding is shaped, in turn, by socially con-
structed perceptions of the role of libraries and archives in the preserva-
tion of cultural heritage, and those perceptions also change over time. 
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13.  The enumeration of variants that follows is based on Kiberd (1992), from his brief history 
of the text, pp. lxxxi–lxxxiii. The Penguin Classics version is based on the 1960 Bodley 
Head edition. 
14.  See, for example, Bornstein & Williams (1993) and P. Cohen (1991). For an exhaustive 
review of this literature, see Tanselle (1996, pp. 2–61).
15.  The law of evidence also deals with the authenticity of records as records, but that is not 
the focus of the present discussion. For a description and analysis of the common law 
rules of evidence that address the authenticity of records as records see MacNeil (2000, 
pp. 46–50).
16.  The specific case to which Wigmore refers is the presumption of due performance of of-
ficial duty that explicitly underpins the admissibility of public documents and implicitly 
underpins the business records exception to the hearsay rule.
17.  The rule governing the admissibility of records of regularly conducted activity is codified 
in the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary (2005, rule 
803(6), p. 16). The admissibility is supported by an oral or written declaration by the 
custodian or other qualified witness that the record meets these conditions.
18.  On this point in general, see Latour & Woolgar (1986).
19.  It is recognized that adjudication of the facts at issue may also fall within the purview of 
a judge, that is, in the case of trial by judge. However, for the purposes of this discussion, 
it is assumed that the trier of fact is a lay jury. In this discussion the terms “trier of fact” 
and “tribunal” are used interchangeably.
20.  The principle is discussed by Cohen (1983), who also coined the term “universal cognitive 
competence.” 
21.  “Polysemic” is one of the adjectives used by Shillingsburg (1993) to describe the changing 
nature of texts in electronic environments. 
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